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CML PROCEDURE SURVEY

INTRODUCTION

In 1993 and the latter part of 1992, the Tenth Circuit addressed several procedurally significant issues. Two rules are of particular interest
due to the current debate surrounding them: Rule 111 and Rule 16.2
Rule 11 is controversial this year because it was recently amended. 3 Rule
4
16 also has been subject to recent debate among judges and scholars.
5
Although some of the Rule 16 requirements are fairly well established,
questions have arisen as to whether Rule 16 is serving its purpose and
6
whether new standards are needed.
The Tenth Circuit decided two Rule 11 cases that exhibit the court's
reluctance to impose sanctions. The court appears weary of the satellite
litigation surrounding Rule 11 motions. In Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc.,7 the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
on an attorney who testified falsely concerning his research. 8 In Griffen v.
Oklahoma City,9 the Tenth Circuit joined other circuits that have refused to
impose a continuing obligation on an attorney to update previously filed
pleadings. 10 These decisions demonstrate that federal courts are becom1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 governs sanctions for the filing of frivolous pleadings, motions,
and other papers in federal court.
2. FED. R. Crv. P. 16 covers the scheduling and management of pretrial conferences.
3. See Denis F. McLaughlin, New FederalRules of Civil Procedures,[sic] N.J. LAw., Jan. 1994,
at 1. See also HenryJ. Reske, A New Rule 11? Court Oks ProceduralAmendments, A.B.A.J.,July
1993, at 26 (noting the controversy surrounding the rule changes). The full text of the new
rule can be found at 61 U.S.L.W. 4365 (Apr. 22, 1993).
4. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerationsfor the Bench and Bar,
C829 ALI-ABA 177, 183 (1993) (viewing Rule 16 litigation as an indication of the tension
between the roles ofjudging and lawyering); David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the
Theory and Practiceof Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1970-71 (1989) (noting that Rule 16
was innovative when it was drafted and that it has since been a focal point in the continuing
debate over the judge's pretrial role).
5. For instance, the rule states that a final pretrial order shall be modified only to
prevent manifest injustice. FED. R. Crv. P. 16. As this survey will discuss, however, courts have
had difficulty determining exactly when manifest injustice is likely to occur. See infra note
164 and accompanying text.
6. See generally John P. Frank, The Rules of Civil Procedure-Agendafor Refornt, 137 U. PA.
L. Rav. 1883 (1989) (reviewing the successes and failures of the first 50 years of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); see alsoJack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Are the Barriersto Justice Being Raised , 137 U. PA. L. Rv. 1901, 1916-17 (1989) (arguing that Rule 16 is ripe for judicial reconsideration, because it is vulnerable to a myriad of
new questions and interpretations).
7. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993). The first time this case reached the Tenth Circuit, the
court vacated and remanded for further findings. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388
(10th Cir. 1992). References to this earlier case are Coffey L References to Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993), the subject of this discussion, are Coffey H.
8. Coffey I, 1 F.3d at 1103.
9. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993).
10. Id. at 339.
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ing less likely to impose Rule 11 sanctions because many judges think the
rule in action has defeated its purpose in theory.1 '
The Tenth Circuit dealt with Rule 16 in two cases involving the modification of pretrial orders. In Joseph Manufacturing Co. v. Olympic Fire
Corp.,12 the court reversed a decision allowing a party to modify a pretrial
order. The court determined that preventing modification would not result in manifest injustice, even though the result was the exclusion of a
state claim preclusion defense that would have settled the litigation. 13 In
Moss v. Feldmeyer,14 the court affirmed the district court's decision allowing
a witness to testify as an expert even though the witness had not been so
designated in the pretrial order.' 5 Further, the court allowed another wit16
ness to testify about matters that had not been specified in the order.
These cases demonstrate some conflict in the court's interpretation of
manifest injustice under Rule 16. To avoid further conflict, a new standard should be implemented to give courts clearer guidance in determining when a pretrial order should be modified.
I.
A.

RULE

11

Background

The revised Rule 11 went into effect on December 1, 1993.1 7 The
United States Supreme Court approved the revisions in April 1993,18 and
implemented them when Congress made no move to change the rule
prior to the December 1, 1993 deadline. 19 Under the revised rule, a party
must be notified in writing that the rule may have been violated before
opposing counsel can move for sanctions. 20 Upon notice, the party may
21
withdraw or correct the pleading, claim, or defense to avoid a penalty.
Other changes to Rule 11 include allowing parties to make factual
assertions they believe will be supported after reasonable discovery. 2 2 This
is a change from the prior requirement that assertions be "well grounded
in fact" at the time the pleadings are filed. 23 Also, the revised rule gives
11.

SeeJames R. Simpson, Note, Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of the 1992 Amendment

Proposal, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 495, 498 (1993) (noting that many judges view Rule 11 as only
the fifth most effective method to manage frivolous suits); Carl Tobias, New Rule in Need of

Trial Run, NAT'L L.J.,June 21, 1993, at 15 (stating that numerous federal judges think Rule
11 has detrimental side effects and is not a very effective deterrent to frivolous cases).
12. 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 418.
14. 979 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1992).
15. Id. at 1456-57.
16. Id.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18. John F. Rooney, Revamped Sanctions Among Largest Federal Rules Changes in 20 Years,
CHI. DAiLY L. BULL., Nov. 30, 1993, at 1.

19. Robert E. Bartkus, Rule 11"s New Teeth Have a BroaderBite, N.J.L.J., Dec. 20, 1993, at
11.
20. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (28 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
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judges more discretion in imposing sanctions and allows fines to be paid
24
to the court instead of to the opposing side.
These changes occurred because of the controversy that has surrounded Rule 11 since its initial amendment in 1983.25 The majority of
the commentary criticizes Rule 11 for defeating its own purpose, which is
to decrease the amount of frivolous litigation. 26 Instead, the amount of
satellite litigation surrounding sanctions has increased. 2 7 Rule 11 is also
criticized for its vague description of exactly what behavior is subject to
sanctions.2 8 Another problem is the extent of an attorney's duty to correct or withdraw frivolous filings. Circuits are split over whether the attor29
ney has a duty to update previously filed pleadings.
The following two Tenth Circuit opinions illustrate the court's reluctance to apply Rule 11 sanctions, perhaps in anticipation of the rule
changes, and its interpretation of continuing duty under the rule.
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinion
1.

Coffey v. Healthtrust,Inc.
a.

30

Facts

David High represented a radiologist, Kenneth Coffey, in an antitrust
suit against Edmond Memorial Hospital. 3 ' Coffey was part of a group that
provided exclusive radiology services to the hospital. 32 In 1988, the hospital entered into an exclusive contract with another doctor, thereby
preventing Coffey from treating patients at the hospital. 3 3 Dr. Coffey's
argument depended on a finding that the hospital's geographic market
was the City of Edmond. 34 High submitted the deposition of Dr. James
Horrell, an expert economist, who stated that since the hospital was the
only one in Edmond, it had market power over that area.3 5 Defendants
24. FED. R. Cry. P. 11.
25. Victor H. Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool to Improve Professional Responsibility, 75
MINN. L. REv. 793, 793 (1991) (noting that since Rule 11 was amended, it has generated over
a thousand judicial opinions and a growing number of articles that fiercely debate the advantages and disadvantages of the rule); Melinda G. Baum, Note, The Seven Year Itch: Is it Time to
Reamend Rule 11 ? 40 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 227, 247 (1991) (arguing that the use of
Rule 11 increased dramatically after the 1983 amendment, but such use has brought with it
inconsistent application and enforcement).
26. Tobias, supra note 11, at 15.
27. Id. (reporting that the amended Rule 11 has engendered much expensive, unnecessary satellite litigation); Simpson, supra note 11, at 500 (arguing that Rule 11 has created
destructive satellite litigation).
28. See Baum, supra note 25, at 234.
29. E.g., Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991) (no continuing
liability of attorney after the pleading is signed); contra Mann v. G. & G. Mfg., 900 F.2d 953
(6th Cir. 1990) (after the complaint is filed, attorney has continuing responsibility to review
pleadings and modify them to conform to Rule 11), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 959 (1990).
30. 1 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 1993) (Coffey Ii).
31. Id. at 1103.
32. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc, 955 F.2d 1388, 1390 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
33. Coffey I, 1 F.3d at 1103.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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offered contradictory evidence and moved for summary judgment.3 6 The
district court took judicial notice of the short distance between Edmond
and eight Oklahoma City hospitals, leading to a probable finding that Edmond Memorial Hospital did not have the necessary geographic market to
37
support Dr. Coffey's argument.
At this point, High submitted, as newly discovered evidence, a study
conducted by Health Care Investment Analysts, Inc. ("Health Care"). The
study considered urban and suburban hospitals to be in the same competitive market only if they were within five miles of each other.38 High attached an affidavit of Dr. Horrell stating that the study supported High's
39
position.
Defendants filed for Rule 11 sanctions against High, presenting affidavits of Health Care officials stating that they told High his intended use
of the study was misguided. 40 The officials told High that the study used
an arbitrary market definition which did not support his position as to the
relevant geographic area.4 1 At the Rule 11 hearing, High testified he had
42
not been so informed.
The district court imposed sanctions.43 On the first appeal, the
Tenth Circuit vacated and remanded because it could not tell whether the
court had imposed sanctions based on High's filing of the pleading or for
having testified falsely.4 4 On remand, the district court again imposed
45
sanctions based on knowingly filing a false and misleading pleading.
The court relied on High's testifying falsely simply to support its finding
4 6
that High knew the pleading was false when he filed it.
b.

Opinion of the Court

The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of Rule 11
sanctions. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit held that testifying falsely was punishable
under different rules; thus, the determination of Rule 11 sanctions would
be no different if High had testified truthfully.48 The court stated that
"while lying may be a disciplinary problem, it is not a subject for Rule 11
sanctions." 49 The court then held that High reasonably relied on Dr. Horrell's expert opinion that the study supported his argument.5 0 Therefore,
36.
37.
mately
38.
39.

Id.
Id. Although not stated in the opinion, it is helpful to know that Edmond is approxi15 miles from Oklahoma City. RAND McNALLY ROAD A'TAs 79 (1991).
Coffey IH, I F.3d at 1103.
Id.

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
Coffey II,1 F.3d at 1103.
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1104-05.
Id. at 1104.
Id.

50. Id.
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High had no duty to disclose that the authors of the study did not think it
51
supported his position.
c.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit decided Coffey II by relying almost exclusively on
one prior case, Schring Corp. v. Vitarine Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,52 which held
that conflict of opinion alone is an insufficient basis for Rule 11 sanctions. 5" This is problematic, because after examining the facts of Coffey II,
it does not appear that the district court's imposition of sanctions was
based on conflict of opinion alone. As previously stated, the district court
based its sanctions on High's filing of a misleading pleading. Further,
High's testimony concerning what he knew at the time of filing was proven
to be a lie. In fact, the district court had responded to High's motion for
rehearing as follows:
[I] n its prior Order, the Court sought to put its finding gently. In
view of the instant motion, the time has come to be more
blunt.... The finding: HCIA [Health Care] witnesses told the
truth when they said that they told High his... exhibit could not
be legitimately proffered for the purpose he54proposed. Mr. High
did not tell the truth when he denied this.
The Tenth Circuit found that it could not impose sanctions based on
High's lie to the court. The Tenth Circuit ignored the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.5 5 That case dealt
with an attorney who defrauded the district court by putting property subject to a pending temporary restraining order (TRO) out of the court's
reach. 56 The district court sanctioned the attorney, using its inherent
power to impose sanctions for "attempts to deprive the Court of jurisdiction, fraud, misleading and lying to the Court."5 7 The court, however,
could not use Rule 11 because it did not directly apply to the attorney's
actions. 58 The United States Supreme Court upheld the district court's
51.

Id.

52. 889 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1989).
53. Id. at 499. This case dealt with attorneys who relied on four medical articles and
published FDA ratings to support their argument that the substitution of an advertised ge-

neric drug for another drug could cause serious health risks. The court found that the attorneys reasonably relied on this information to make their claim, even though the attorneys
were aware of a study that neither proved nor disproved the health risk from substitution.

This case seems to differ from Coffey II because David High had only one source of information to support his argument; he was clearly told the study did not support his argument; and

the study in Schering Cop. was inconclusive.
54. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1394 (10th Cir. 1992) (Coffey 1).
55. 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
56. The attorney was notified by opposing counsel on a Friday that a TRO order against
the property at issue was pending, and would be heard by the court on Monday. That weekend, the attorney and his client began transferring the property to the client's sister in order
to deprive the court of jurisdiction to issue the TRO. During the TRO hearing, the judge
telephoned the attorney to ask about the possibility that the property was in the process of
being sold. The attorney made no mention of the recordation of the deeds earlier that
morning. Later, after the transfer of the property was complete, the attorney informed the
judge he had intentionally withheld the information from the court. Id. at 2128-29.
57. Id. at 2131.
58. Id.
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imposition of sanctions. 59 The Court held that the sanctioning scheme of
the Federal Rules does not displace the inherent power of a court to impose sanctions for bad-faith conduct. 60 This is true even if procedural
61
rules exist that sanction the same conduct.
The district court in the Coffey cases sanctioned High once and reinstated the sanctions on remand. Even if the district court had not felt
High's actions fell under Rule 11, it could have used its inherent power to
sanction High's conduct. The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.62 makes the Tenth Circuit's reversal even
more surprising. In Cooter, the Court held that an appellate court should
use an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's award
of sanctions. 63 The Court stated that district courts are in the best position to determine whether a sanction is warranted because such a determination is fact-intensive and based on some assessment of the signer's
64
credibility.
The Tenth Circuit did address Cooter in the first Coffey decision. In
fact, the court quoted Cooter's holding by stating a court's inquiry in determining Rule 11 sanctions is rooted in factual determinations. 65 Nevertheless, in the second Coffey decision, the Tenth Circuit completely
backtracked, stating that "[a]lthough imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, . . [Rule 11] is an
evolving area of the law" 66 The court further asserted that "it is difficult
for a district court to predict accurately the development of the law in
67
light of the various decisions that are being made."
This last statement by the Tenth Circuit warrants the conclusion that
the court was anticipating the changes to Rule 11. For instance, the old
rule required that pleadings be supported by existing law or by a good
faith argument for its extension. 68 The new version calls for a non-frivolous, rather than good faith, argument. 6 9 Courts have interpreted "frivolous" to mean the absence of any basis for the proffered argument-a
lower standard than the previous good faith requirement. 70 Some commentators have said this change is in response to Rule lI's chilling effect
59. Id. at 2136.
60. Id.
61. The Court addressed Rule II as follows:
It is true that the District Court could have employed Rule 11 to sanction Chambers
for filing "false and frivolous pleadings" . . . and that some of the other conduct
might have been reached through other rules. Much of the bad-faith conduct by
Chambers, however, was beyond the reach of the rules.., and the conduct sanctionable under the rules was intertwined within conduct that only the inherent
power could address.
Id. This language seems directly applicable to the facts in the Coffey cases.
62. 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
63. Id. at 405.
64. Id. at 402, 404.
65. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 955 F.2d 1388, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1992)(Coffey 1).
66. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1993)(Coffey fl).
67. Id.
68. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (28 U.S.C. app. (1988)).
69. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
70. Simpson, supra note 11, at 505.
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on creative advocacy. 71 Arguably, knowledge of this new direction helped
the court get around High's bad faith in not mentioning that the writers
of the study did not think it supported his argument. Further, the court
gave great weight to Dr. Horrell's testimony at the Rule 11 hearing. Dr.
Horrell stated that "even when presented with the contradictory conclusion of the authors of the study," he did not change his belief that the
study supported High's position. 72 Therefore, the court felt that some basis existed for High's argument despite his bad faith in presenting it.
Even if the Tenth Circuit did not specifically gear its decision to the
revised Rule 11, perhaps it was merely expressing its weariness with the
litigation surrounding the old rule. The Coffey case was appealed to the
Tenth Circuit twice. The court appeared to see the irony in the amount of
litigation surrounding a rule that is supposed to reduce the amount of
filings in the legal system. Future decisions will reveal whether the revised
rule will alleviate this problem, perhaps through the provision calling for
73
sanctions to be paid to the court, rather than to the opposing party.
2.

74
Griffen v. Oklahoma City

a. Facts
The plaintiffs were employees of the Oklahoma CityJail who filed suit
against the City in state court alleging negligent infliction of emotional
distress, as well as several Constitutional claims. 75 The plaintiffs claimed
that the City knowingly exposed them to asbestos fibers contained in the
insulation on water pipes in the jail, causing anxiety, mental anguish, and
an increased risk of cancer. 7 6 The City removed the action to federal
court based on the Constitutional claims. 77 The court granted the City's
motion for summary judgment on the merits, determining that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence of compensable injury. 78 The City then
filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 79 and title
12, section 2011 of the Oklahoma Code.8 0 The court denied the motion,
71. Id. See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The

Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1938 (1989) (noting that in a one-year period in
the Third Circuit, Rule 11 had a disproportionately adverse impact on civil rights plaintiffs).
72. Coffey v. Healthtrust, Inc., 1 F.3d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1993)(Coffey I).
73. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11. The rule states that sanctions may consist of an order to pay a
penalty into court. Penalties will be paid to the other party only if "warranted for effective
deterrence." Id.
74. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. Id. at 337. The Constitutional claims were based on the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
76. Id. at 337-38.
77. Id. at 338.
78. Id. at 338 n.2.
79. The City appealed the trial court's denial of its claim for attorney's fees, costs, and

sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This section provides that an attorney who manipulates
proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally,
the excess costs, expenses and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
The Tenth Circuit remanded this issue back to the district court for a finding in support of

its denial. Id. at 342 n.13.
80. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 338. OKLA. STAT.
counterpart to Rule 11.

ANN.

tit. 12 § 2011 (West 1993) is the state's
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holding that the plaintiffs had not violated any of the rules.8 1 The City
appealed, contending the court abused its discretion by concluding the
82
rules had not been violated.
b.

Opinion of the Court

The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, but only with regard to
whether the district court should have applied the state counterpart to
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
court that Rule 11 sanctions did not apply to the pleadings filed in state
court.8 3 The court divided the case into three separate issues: 1) Whether
the plaintiff could be subject to Rule 11 sanctions based on the plaintiff's
original complaint, which was filed in state court prior to removal to federal court; 2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to
impose Rule 11 sanctions based on pleadings filed after removal; and 3)
Whether the district court had the authority to impose sanctions for the
filing of the original complaint based on title 12, section 2011 of the
84
Oklahoma Code.
Regarding the first issue, the court followed precedent holding that
Rule 11 does not apply to a pleading made in state court, even if the case is
later removed to federal court.8 5 The court went further, however, and
established the Tenth Circuit's stance on whether there is a continuing
duty to update previously filed pleadings. The court noted that the removal of an action to federal court supports the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions only if the rule imposes a continuing obligation on the signer to
update previously filed pleadings.8 6 The Tenth Circuit went on to assert,
"today we join those circuits that have concluded that Rule 11 does not
87
impose such an obligation."
Secondly, the court addressed whether the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to impose sanctions on those pleadings made by the
plaintiff after removal. 88 The Tenth Circuit noted that the district court
had not made any findings or given any explanation for its denial of sanctions on this basis. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit had no way to judge89 the
exercise of the court's discretion, and remanded for those findings.
81.
82.
83.

Griffen, 3 F.3d at 338.
Id.
Id. at 340.

84. Id. at 338.
85. Id. at 339 (following Dahnke v. Teamsters Local 695, 906 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1990),
Foval v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 841 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1988) and Kirby v. Allegheny
Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987)). These cases derived their decisions from two
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Crv. P. 1 states that the rules govern the
procedure in the United States district courts, and FED. R.Civ. P. 81 (c) dictates that the rules
apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and
govern procedure aJer removal (emphasis added).
86. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 339.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 340.
89. Id.
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Finally, the court addressed whether the district court could impose
sanctions under Oklahoma's counterpart to Rule 11. The court noted
that the few courts addressing this issue had decided a district court possessed this authority. 90 The Tenth Circuit, finding no authority to the
contrary, agreed, and again instructed the district court to state its reasons
on remand for the denial of sanctions under the state counterpart to Rule
11.91

c.

Analysis

Griffen answered two previously unaddressed questions concerning
Rule 11 in the Tenth Circuit. First, the Tenth Circuit aligned itself with
those circuits holding an attorney does not have a continuing duty to update previously filed pleadings. 92 The court will need to reinterpret this
holding in light of the revised Rule 11. The Griffen court based its decision
on the old requirement that the pleading be evaluated at the time of signing the pleading. 93 Under the revised Rule 11, this language now reads:
"by presenting to the court (whether by signing,filing submitting or later advocating) a pleading ... ."94 Some commentators who have reviewed the
revisions and the advisory comments have concluded that this new language, while broader than the current rule, does not impose a continuing
duty to amend or withdraw previously filed pleadings. Rather, the attorney merely cannot advocate that specific pleading in later argument. 9 5
Nevertheless, this new requirement most likely will be open to interpretation by the courts, and a few commentators say the language is confusing.9 6 Further, even if there is not a continuing duty to update a pleading,
the attorney would be wise to withdraw that pleading and avoid the unin90. Id. at 341; see Harrison v. Luse, 760 F.Supp. 1394, 1401 (D. Col.), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1259
(10th Cir. 1991); Schmitz v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc., 124 F.D.R. 189, 192 (N.D. Il1.); 1989
Crowell v. Holy Order of Mans, 39 Fed.R.Serv. 2d 1223, 1224 (D. Mass. 1984).
91. Id. at 342.
92. See Brubaker v. City of Richmond, 943 F.2d 1363 (4th Cir. 1991); Schoenberger v.
Oselka, 909 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1990); Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Banov, 899 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Associated Contractors, Inc., 877 F.2d 938
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1079 (1990).
93. Griffen, 3 F.3d at 339.
94. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (emphasis added).
95. See Simpson, supra note 11, at 508 (stating that the proposal does not impose a continuing duty); Georgene M. Vairo, Civil Practiceand Litigation Techniques in the Federal Courts,
C837 ALI-ABA 21, 26 (May 20, 1993) (reporting that the new language does not incorporate
the continuing duty to withdraw papers, but means an attorney could not continue to press a
position that was no longer tenable). Both sources note an earlier version of the proposed
rule change, which would have imposed a continuing duty, that was met with severe criticism.
The proposed rule was then modified to the present language. Simpson, supra note 11, at
508, Vairo, supra, at 26-27.
96. See, e.g., J. Stratton Shartel, Litigators Say Rule 11 Proposal Will Lead to Gamesmanship, 6
No. 11 PH-INLIT 1 (Nov. 1992). Shartel reports that some litigators think the new requirement remedies nothing and creates a problem, because it fails to define "later advocating."
An advantage of having no continuing obligation is that you have a "clear benchmark." One
attorney surveyed says that the extension of the obligation to any point in the litigation could
require "eternal notification of the countless number" of Rule 11 controversies that could
arise. Id.
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tentional mention of it later in the proceedings. 97 It is likely, however,
that the Tenth Circuit, having just decided there is no continuing duty to
amend or withdraw previously filed pleadings, would interpret the new
Rule 11 consistently with that opinion.
Second, the Griffen court decided that a federal court can apply a state
sanction rule after the case is removed to federal court. This case did not
trigger an Erie98 question, because it was removed to federal court under a
federal question, rather than diversity jurisdiction. It is unclear, however,
whether the Griffen holding would apply to a case removed to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit, by its reliance on Schmitz
v. Campbell-Mithun, Inc.,99 a diversity jurisdiction case, appeared to indicate
that it would apply Griffen in the diversity context. The Schmitz court discussed Erie, but found it irrelevant because "Rule 11 does not apply to the
filing of a complaint in state court."100 The court reasoned that since
there was no conflict between state and federal law, Erie did not apply.10 1
The Schmitz court rationalized that if a federal court could not apply the
state counterpart to Rule 11, plaintiffs could file baseless papers in state
court and escape sanctions if the defendant removed the case to federal
court. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit also relied on other federal cases which held

that a federal court could apply state rules of procedure to conduct occur1 03
ring prior to removal.
Although, at first glance, the Tenth Circuit's reasoning and reliance
on other decisions seems well-grounded, the outcome in a future diversity
104
case is uncertain due to the confusion surrounding the Erie doctrine.
At least one scholar has argued that federal courts should not apply state
procedural rules in a federal court setting.1 0 5 This is because Erie generally dictates the application of state substantive rules and federal procedural
97. See Vairo, supra note 95, at 27 (noting that although there is no duty under the new
rule to formally withdraw the paper or position taken, withdrawal of the paper generally will
immunize the target from sanctions). Cf McLaughlin, supra note 3, at 12 (interpreting the
new Rule 11 as imposing an affirmative duty to withdraw a frivolous claim regardless of
whether a subsequent paper has been filed).
98. Erie RR. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The case is generally thought to hold
that federal courts must apply state substantive law to cases brought before them under diver-

sityjurisdiction. See DAVID W. LoUISELL

ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCE-

569 (6th ed. 1989).
99. 124 F.R.D. 189 (N.D. 11. 1989) (employment discrimination action in which sanctions were requested on pleadings filed prior to removal to the federal district court).
100. Id. at 192.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. McKenna v. Beezy, 130 F.R.D. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying Illinois law concerning
DURE

failure to prosecute for conduct which occurred prior to removal); Winkels v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that Minnesota rule governing commencement of actions applied to action removed to federal court); Nealy v. Transportacion

Maritima Mexicana, S.A., 662 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1980) (state service of process rule applied
to service made while action was in state court prior to removal).
104. SeeJohn B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality of Erie, 41 AMER. U. L. REV. 1087, 1130 (1992)
(noting that many scholars have described Erie as "confused").
105. Jeffrey A. Parness, Choices About Attorney Fee-Shifting Laws: Further Substance/Procedure
Problems Under Erie and Elsewhere, 49 U. Prrr. L. REv. 393, 395-96 (1988). Parness asserts that
state procedural rules were intended to be used in state courts and have no business being

applied in a federal court. Id.

1994]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

rules in federal courts. 10 6 Additionally, state rules of procedure arguably
are not intended for use in federal courts, since states usually have a fairly
small interest in the conduct of federal litigation. 10 7 In sum, the Erie issue
concerning a federal court's application of a state procedural rule appears
open for further interpretation.
II.
A.

RULE

16

Background

Although it has not spawned as much controversy as Rule 11, Rule 16
has generated its own share of criticism and commentary.1 0 8 The goal of
the original rule promulgated in 1938 was to encourage, but not require,
judges to participate in sharpening and simplifying the issues to be litigated at trial. 10 9 The broad language of the original rule 110 resulted in a
great range of practices amongjudges.1 11 As a result, judges began questioning the rule and suggesting reform.1 12 Judge Charles E. Clark, formerly of the Second Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, criticized the rule
because it was so cumbersome that judges were spending more time organizing pretrials than actual trials.1 13 He suggested the rule should be
reformed to focus on the conference, rather than the pretrial pleadings,
and that pretrial should be kept in perspective as an accessory rather than
a substitute for trial.1 1 4 Judge Milton Pollack, District Judge, Southern
District of New York, argued that pretrial should serve to narrow issues
and expedite trials. Therefore, the rule needed to be streamlined in order
to allow judges to take control early in the case. 115 One purpose of the
1983 amendment to Rule 16 was to increase judicial control of litiga106. Id. at 395 (emphasis added). The author argues that federal courts have misinterpreted footnote 31 of Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975),
which states that when a state law does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of
court, a state law concerning attorney's fees that reflects a substantial policy of the state
should be followed. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31. Parness interprets this language as applying to state substantive laws concerning attorney's fees, but not to state proceduralrules governing attorney's fees. Parness, supra note 105, at 414. For instance, a rule related to
conduct triggering a cause of action is substantive, but a rule related to conduct during litigation is procedural. Id. at 401.
107. Parness, supra note 105, at 395.
108. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
109. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1978.
110. The original rule provided in part:
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the conference, the
amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements made by the parties as
to any of the matters considered . . . and such order when entered controls the
subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest
injustice. The court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on
which actions may be placed for consideration as above provided ....
FED. R. Crv. P. 16 (1983); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1970 n.2.
111. Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1981. Shapiro reports that surveys done between the rule's
introduction and amendment revealed that some judges made little use of the rule while
others invented elaborate local rules requiring pretrial conferences in most cases. Id.
112. Charles E. Clark, To an Understanding Use of Pre-Tria, 29 F.R.D. 191, 454 (1962);
Milton Pollack, Pretrial Conferences, 50 F.R.D. 427, 451 (1971).
113. Clark, supra note 112, at 458.
114. Id. at 461.
115. Pollack, supra note 112, at 451-52.
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tion.1 1 6 The amendment authorized early scheduling conferences, called
for "the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses," and provided for
1 17
sanctions against parties for failing to comply with pretrial orders.
Since the amendment, questions have arisen as to the imposition of
sanctions, the judge's role in settlement, and the modification of pretrial
orders.' 18 One commentator has questioned whether the authorization
of sanctions has made matters worse by adding a layer of tactical maneuvering by lawyers. 1 19 The judge's role in settlement was hotly debated after the Seventh Circuit's decision in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp. 120 That case held that ajudge has authority under Rule 16 to sanction parties for failing to appear at a settlement conference. 12 1 One critic
of the holding argues that it allows judges to force alternative dispute reso122
lution on parties in order to avoid sanctions.
The most heavily litigated aspect of Rule 16 is the modification of
pretrial orders. 123 This aspect of the Rule is the subject of the following
Tenth Circuit opinions.
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinion
1.

24

Joseph Manufacturing Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp.1
a.

Facts

Joseph Manufacturing Company ('Joseph") contracted with Olympic
Fire Corporation ("Olympic") to inspect and service Joseph's two fire extinguishers. 125 Olympic serviced and pressurized the extinguishers, and
Joseph paid for the service. 126 A month later, a fire broke out, causing
extensive property damage to Joseph's property. Neither extinguisher
127
functioned.
Joseph filed a diversity action against Olympic in federal court, claiming breach of contract and implied warranty in negligently maintaining
the extinguishers.' 28 A week later, the owner of the building leased by
Joseph filed suit in state court against Joseph, as her lessee, and against
116. Richey, supra note 4, at 182; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1985.
117.

FED. R. Civ. P. 16.

118. See Richey, supra note 4; see also E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution
of Procedure,53 U. CHI. L. REv. 306, 314-18 (1986) (reviewing the debate between those who
think increased managerial judging is needed to increase efficiency in the system, and those
who oppose increased judicial involvement because it forces litigants to abandon positions
on the merits);Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. R~v. 376 (1982) (generally opposing managerial judging).

119. Elliott, supra note 118, at 319-20.
120. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
121. Id. at 656-57.
122. Kelly J. Applegate, Note, G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp.: The Use of
InherentJudicialPower Within the Limitations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,17J. CONTEMP.
L. 159, 165-69 (1991).
123. Richey, supra note 4, at 191.
124. 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).

125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 417.
Id.
Id.
Joseph Mfg. Co., v. Olympic Fire Corp., 781 F.Supp. 718 (D. Kan. 1991).
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Olympic. 1 2 9 In August 1990, the state court granted Joseph's motion for
directed verdict based on a lease provision exoneratingJoseph from liability to the owner.1 30 Despite the directed verdict, the court permitted the
jury to compare fault between Joseph and Olympic. 13 1 The 2jury found
13
that Olympic was 55% at fault and Joseph was 45% at fault.
On September 6, 1990, Olympic asked the federal court for permission to modify its pretrial order so Olympic could file for summary judgment based on the state court judgment.' 33 However, the federal court
had set February 5, 1990, as the date of the final pretrial conference and
April 16, 1990, as the deadline for filing all dispositive motions.1 34 Joseph
objected to the motion to amend, but in November 1991, the district court
granted the motion to amend and entered summary judgment in favor of
135
Olympic. Joseph appealed.
b.

Opinion of the Court

The Tenth Circuit began by reviewing the district court's analysis in
order to determine whether the court had abused its discretion. 13 6 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court had muddled its analysis by
failing to separate two distinct issues: first, whether the order should have
been modified, and second, whether the district court was required to give
judgment to Olympic because the state court had done so.t37 The Tenth
Circuit stated that the "keystone" of this case was Rule 16(e),13 8 because
before Olympic could even raise the state preclusion defense, it had to
demonstrate it was entitled to modify the pretrial order. 139
The Tenth Circuit conceded that the district court had correctly followed the language of Rule 16, which requires that a pretrial order shall
not be modified absent a showing of manifest injustice. 140 According to
the Tenth Circuit, however, the district court allowed the order to be modified without any explanation of the manifest injustice that would have
otherwise resulted.' 4 ' The Tenth Circuit, upon reviewing the facts of the
case, decided that if anyone suffered from manifest injustice, it wasJoseph,
129. Id. at 719.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 720. This was done in accordance with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(c) (1991).
Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418 n.2.
132. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418.
133. Id.
134. Id.

135. Id.
136. Id. The court relied on the holding of Burnette v. Dresser Indus., 849 F.2d 1277,
1282 (10th Cir. 1988) that an abuse of discretion standard is to be used when reviewing the

district court's decision to modify a pretrial order.
137. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418.
138. Id. Rule 16(e) reads, "After any conference held pursuant to this rule, an order shall
be entered reciting the action taken. This order shall control the subsequent course of the
action unless modified by a subsequent order. The order following a final pretrial conference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice." FED. R. Cirv. P. 16(e).
139. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418-19.
140. Id. at 419. See supra note 138 for the pertinent text of Rule 16(e).
141.

Id.
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rather than Olympic. 142 The court noted that when the federal pretrial
order was concluded, Olympic knew of the pendency and status of the
state action, but failed to mention this at the hearing. 143 Further, Joseph's
counsel claimed he was not apprised of the state action's status at that
time. 144 The court indicated it was Olympic's duty to bring the matter up
at the pretrial hearing, and not having done so, it could not later have the
order amended. 145 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's
modification of the pretrial order effectively denied Joseph a fair day in
146
court, and reversed and remanded the case.
c.

Analysis

As the Tenth Circuit noted, a district court's decision whether to
47
modify a pretrial order is subject to an abuse of discretion standard.'
Several cases have held that a court of appeals generally should not interfere with a district court's finding in this area.' 48 The Tenth Circuit's reversal was thus somewhat unusual. Although the court stated it was basing
reversal on the district court's mixing of two separate issues, 149 the court's
main disagreement was with the district court's findings of fact concerning
manifest injustice.' 5 0 The district court had decided to modify the order
based on the following facts:
The district court thought it was important that when Joseph filed its
original answer in state court, Joseph failed to include a crossclaim against
Olympic.' 5 1 The district court noted that Kansas courts adhere to an "extremely tenacious" one-trial-of-issues policy in cases subject to comparative
fault. 15 2 The district court held thatJoseph was required by Kansas law to
bring its crossclaim against Olympic in the state court action. 153 Because
Joseph neglected to do so, the federal court interpreted Kansas law to dic154
tate thatJoseph was barred from re-litigating the issue in federal court.
142. Id. at 420. The court quoted from 6A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
§ 1527, at 287-89 (1990): "[I]f the evidence or issue was
within the knowledge of the party seeking modification [of the pretrial order] at the time of
the [pretrial] conference or if modification would place a great burden on the opposing
party, then it may not be allowed." The court concluded that if any injustice ever arose from
these facts, it was the effect of Olympic's silence on Joseph. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 420.
143. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 419.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 419-20.
146. Id. at 420-21.
147. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
148. Nickerson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 900 F.2d 412, 422 (1st Cir. 1990) (stating that the
handling and enforcement of pretrial orders is an area in which appellate courts are, quite
properly, loathe to tread); Daniels v. Bd. of Education, 805 F.2d 203, 210 (6th Cir. 1986)
(describing the decision whether to modify a final pretrial order as a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court). See also Ramires Pomales v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 839
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990); Allen v. United States Steel Corp., 665 F.2d 689 (5th Cir. 1982).
149. Joseph Mfg. Co., 986 F.2d at 418-20.
150. Id. at 419.
151. Joseph Mfg. Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp., 781 F.Supp. 718, 720-22. (D. Kan. 1991),
rev'd, 986 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1993).
152. Id. at 721.
153. Id. at 722.
154. Id. at 721-22.
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE
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The court so held despite Joseph's argument that Olympic waived the
right to rely on the preclusive state judgment by failing to discuss that
possible defense in the pretrial order. 155 The court based its holding on
Kansas decisions which held that the triggering event for a one-action defense was an actual verdict in a state court.156 Therefore, the district court
concluded that Olympic did not waive the defense by not bringing up the
state court action when no verdict had been rendered at the time of the
1 57

pretrial hearing.

Although the district court never explicitly stated its finding of manifest injustice, it is apparent the court found manifest injustice would result
to Olympic if it were not allowed to raise its state preclusion defense, especially in light of Joseph's failure to adhere to the Kansas one-trial rule. It
appears likely that the court concluded it would do manifest injustice to
Kansas law by not recognizing that state's strong belief in the one-trial
rule.
The Tenth Circuit took a differing view of the facts, arguing that Joseph did attempt to make a late cross-claim in state court, but Olympic
opposed the motion. 15 8 The Tenth Circuit stated that Olympic could not
advocate a "double standard" regarding the joinder of claims by taking
"diametrically opposed positions in state and federal court.' 59 The Tenth
Circuit also disagreed with Olympic's argument that it did not mention
the state action at the pretrial hearing because the verdict had not yet
been rendered at that time. The court relied on Rule 16 to come to this
conclusion, stating, "[n] othing in Rule 16 prevents a party from identifying
a potentially controlling legal principle simply because it is inchoate at the
time the pretrial order is drafted."' 6 The court dismissed the district
court's reliance on Kansas precedent in determining that Olympic could
not waive its preclusion defense by its failure to address the defense at the
pretrial hearing. The court reasoned that the question presented did not
require consideration of whether Olympic could waive its preclusion
6
defense.' '
Although the Tenth Circuit never stated exactly how the district court
abused its discretion, it appears that the court thought the district court
misinterpreted the facts surrounding manifest injustice. This exposes the
problem with the language of Rule 16, because if determining manifest
injustice is merely a fact-specific inquiry, little guidance is provided to
practitioners as to exactly when a pretrial order can be modified.
Commentators have recognized that Rule 16 allows judges broad discretion.' 6 2 However, when judges decide cases on a fact-specific basis, the
155. Id. at 722-23.
156. Id. at 723.
157. Id.
158. Joseph Mfg. Co. v. Olympic Fire Corp., 986 F.2d 416, 419 (10th Cir. 1993).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 419-20.
161. Id. at 420.
162. See Richey, supra note 4, at 177 (arguing that Rule 16 effectively lays to rest the
historical model of the passive judge); Shapiro, supra note 4, at 1992-93 (noting that "flexibil-
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drafters corresponding goal of uniformity in the Federal Rules 163 seems to
go by the wayside. An examination of decisions regarding the modification of pretrial orders reveals that the Tenth Circuit and other circuits
have not been consistent in determining the meaning of manifest
injustice. 1 6 4

A few decisions provide a better method of determining this elusive
requirement, at least when dealing with the exclusion of witnesses or testimony not specified in a pretrial order. 165 The following Tenth Circuit
case illustrates the application of a balancing test to define manifest
injustice.
2.

66

Moss v. Feldmeyer1
a. Facts

Amanda Moss sued Dr. Seeley Feldmeyer for malpractice, claiming
that his failure to hospitalize her mother, Linda Fincham, led to
Fincham's death. 1 67 On August 10, 1990, the district court issued a pretrial order. 68 The order listed Dr. David Dejong as a witness, and Drs.
Dennis Kepka and Roger Evans as expert witnesses for Feldmeyer. 169 The
order provided that a list of all witnesses and exhibits which the parties
failed to describe in the order should be filed not later than October 5,
1990.170

Trial was set for October 9,

1990.171

In August of 1990,

Feldmeyer provided Moss with Dr. Evans' report, but Moss did not depose
Dr. Evans. 17 2 On September 24, 1990, Feldmeyer notified Moss that he
intended to call Dr. Dejong, designated only as a witness in the pretrial
order, as an expert witness. 173 Moss objected on the basis that the time
permitted to name expert witnesses had expired, and Dr. Dejong was
ity and discretion were major themes of the rulemakers, and thus they should not have been
surprised that many judges used that flexibility to implement ideas the rulemakers did not
wholly share").
163. 4 CHARLEsA. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 100204 (1987), Charles E. Clark &James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure,44 YALE L. J. 387,
389 (1935), Michael E. Smith & Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules:
Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002-06
(1990).
164. Burnette v. Dresser Indus., 849 F.2d 1277, 1282-84 (10th Cir. 1988) (engaging in a
two-page factual inquiry to determine whether disallowing modification to add a design and
manufacturing defect claim would result in manifest injustice); Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget
Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that although an amendment to a pretrial order did prejudice the nonmoving party, since the moving party acted in good faith,
the lower court correctly granted the amendment); In re Delagrange, 820 F.2d 229, 232 (7th
Cir. 1987) (weighing "possible hardships" to the parties, "the need for doing justice," and the
need for "orderly procedural arrangements").
165. See infra section (B) (2) (c) and accompanying notes 192-203.
166. 979 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1992).
167. Id. at 1456.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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named outside the time permitted by the pretrial order.1 74 At a hearing
on October 4, 1990, the court ruled that Dr. Dejong would not be allowed
to testify. 175
Prior to trial on October 9, 1990, the court conducted an in camera
hearing to consider a new report submitted by Dr. Evans. 176 Feldmeyer
argued that since Dr. Dejong, a pathologist, had not been permitted to
testify, Dr. Evans now needed to use the new report in order to testify
concerning pathology. 17 7 Moss objected, stating that Dr. Evans was a cardiologist, and now Feldmeyer wanted to "make him" a pathologist.17 8 The
court ruled that both Dr. Dejong and Dr. Evans could testify, as long as
they would be available for Moss to conduct discovery concerning their
proposed testimony.' 79 Moss did not ask for a continuance, and although
she deposed Dr. Dejong, she did not depose Dr. Evans.18 0 Feldmeyer won
the trial, and Moss appealed, contending that the court abused its discretion in allowing Feldmeyer to add Dr. Dejong as an expert and to expand
8
Dr. Evans' testimony.' '
b.

Opinion of the Court

In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit rejected Moss' argument that the district court's actions were in direct violation of Smith v.
Ford Motor Co.18 2 Smith held that a district court had abused its discretion
by allowing a medical doctor, designated in the pretrial order as an expert
on treatment and prognosis, to testify about proximate causation between
seatbelts and injury.' 83 In Smith, the Tenth Circuit adopted a four-part
test to determine whether a district court has abused its discretion in excluding or allowing testimony not specified in a pretrial order:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom
the excluded witnesses would have testified; (2) the ability of that
party to cure the prejudice; (3) the extent to which waiver of the
rule against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly
and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in court; and (4)
bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's
order. 184
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Moss from Smith, noting that first:
Moss was not prejudiced or surprised because both Dr. Evans and Dr.
174. Id. Although the pretrial order specified October 5, 1990, as the deadline for
amending the order to add new witnesses or exhibits, the order was issued August 10, 1990.
Moss most likely argued that if the order was to be amended between August and October, it
should be amended only to prevent manifest injustice.

175. Id.
176.

Id. at 1457.

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1458.
182. 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981).
183. Id. at 798.
184. Id. at 797 (quoting Myers v. Pennyback Woods Home Ownership Ass'n., 559 F.2d
894, 904-05 (3d Cir. 1977)).
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Dejong were listed as witnesses in the pretrial order; Moss received a summary of their reports prior to their testimony; and both doctors were available for discovery prior to testifying.' 8 5 Further, Moss, at her option, did
not depose Dr. Evans. 18 6 Second, while the attorney in Smith had only
eleven minutes to prepare for cross-examination, Moss had over two weeks
87
to prepare for Dr. Dejong and eight days to prepare for Dr. Evans.'
18
8
Therefore, her "ability to cure was not significantly impaired.
Third,
the challenged testimony in Smith was revealed in the middle of the trial,
whereas Moss was aware of both doctors' testimony prior to trial.' 8 9
Therefore, no disruption of the trial was threatened in Moss.190 Finally,
the court did not find bad faith, because the lower court knew it was "dealing with good lawyers who [knew] the subject," and who could inquire into
the testimony to avoid surprise. 19 1
c.

Analysis

While the Tenth Circuit's determination of manifest injustice in Moss
was fact-specific, the court followed a test identified in prior case law to
reach its decision. Unfortunately, the test seems to apply only to the exclusion of witnesses or testimony, rather than to the exclusion or inclusion
of a claim or defense. When dealing with the latter, the Tenth Circuit has
often used a fact-specific inquiry such as the one in Griffen v. Oklahoma
City.' 9 2 Other circuit decisions have varied, sometimes relying on whether
an amendment would change the result as a matter of law, 193 or even
whether a party is proceeding pro se.19 4 Again, if uniformity is a desired
goal of Rule 16, a test like that used in Smith might assist judges in making
consistent determinations concerning the exclusion or inclusion of claims
not set out in the pretrial order.
A second concern is that, although the test articulated in Smith has
been around since 1980, courts have not consistently applied it to cases on
point with Smith. The Tenth Circuit has applied the Smith factors in a
fairly consistent manner to cases involving the inclusion or exclusion of
witnesses. 195
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Moss v. Feldmeyer, 979 F.2d 1454, 1459 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

190. Id.
191. Id. at 1460.
192. 3 F.3d 336 (10th Cir. 1993); see suprasection (B)(1)(c) and accompanying note 165.
193. Malhiot v. Southern Cal. Retail Clerks Union, 735 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985).
194. Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
195. See, e.g., Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1425 (10th Cir. 1991);

Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 900 F.2d 223, 225 (10th Cir. 1990); MacCuish v. United States,
844 F.2d 733, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1988). All directly applied the Smith factors to determine if

manifest injustice would occur from the exclusion or inclusion of witnesses or testimony not
specified in the pretrial order.

1994]

CIVIL PROCEDURE

There are a few exceptions, however. In Grant v. Brandt,196 the Tenth
Circuit addressed whether the lower court abused its discretion in exclud97
The
ing the testimony of a witness not specified in the pretrial order.'
Tenth Circuit quoted Smith's abuse of discretion standard, but did not utilize the Smith test in making its determination. The court appeared to
weigh only the prejudice to the nonmoving party against the loss of the
witness's testimony.' 98 In LeMaire v. United States,19 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed whether an expert witness who was designated in the pretrial order as testifying about one matter should have been allowed to testify
20
about another topic. 20 0 The court relied on Perry v. Winspur, 1 stating
that the complaining party should have anticipated the witness's testimony
based on the issues in the case, even though the testimony was not specifically identified in the pretrial order.2 0 2 The court also noted that the
complaining party had failed to ask for a continuance upon learning of
the testimony.2 0 3 It is therefore somewhat difficult for a practitioner to
anticipate how the Tenth Circuit will weigh an appeal of the district
court's exclusion or inclusion of witnesses or testimony not designated in
the pretrial order.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended to promote uniformity in all federal courts. 204 Federal courts could advance this goal by
interpreting Rule 16 with some sort of consistency. The balancing test
such as the one in Smith for cases involving the exclusion or inclusion of
witnesses, is just one attempt at a useful test. Other cases illustrate that
205
there are also other tests. In Lirette v. Popich Bros. Water Transport Inc.,
the court held that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to modify a pretrial order to allow a witness not specified in the order to
testify. 20 6 The court placed the most emphasis on the moving party's failure to explain why the witness was not listed in the order. 20 7 The court
also addressed "unfairness" to the other party.20 8 In Bradley v. United
States,20 9 the court based its determination of manifest injustice on: 1) the
importance of the experts' testimony; 2) potential prejudice to the nonmoving party; 3) the possibility of a continuance; and 4) the moving
party's explanation for its conduct.2 10 The court concluded that witnesses
not specified in the pretrial order should have been precluded from testi196.
197.
198.
199.

796 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 354-55.
See id. at 355.
826 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1987).

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 951-52.
782 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1986).
LeMaire, 826 F.2d at 952.
Id. at 953.
See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
660 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 144-45.
Id.
Id. at 145.
866 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 125-26.
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fying. 2 1 1 Finally, in Nickerson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 2 1 2 the court determined
no manifest injustice occurred solely on the basis that the nonmoving
party had an opportunity to depose witnesses prior to the issuance of the
pretrial order.

21 3

Given the above variations, it remains unclear how a particular federal
court will address the modification of pretrial orders to exclude or include
witnesses.
CONCLUSION

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit followed the latest trend
to reevaluate Rule 11 sanctions. The court showed a reluctance to impose
sanctions against an attorney whose actions seemed to warrant them. The
Tenth Circuit also joined other circuits that have refused, under Rule 11,
to impose a continuing obligation on attorneys to update previously filed
pleadings. With respect to Rule 16, the Tenth Circuit illustrated that while
Smith provides a viable test, greater consistency is needed in determining
the meaning of manifest injustice under the rule. Further guidance from
the court in this area would be welcome.
Kathryn A. Plonsky

211. Id. at 127.
212. 900 F.2d 412 (1st Cir. 1990).
213. Id. at 421-22.

